Please join the Board, staff, fellow ACS members and supporters and special guests as we celebrate another successful year for the American Constitution Society.  We will thank outgoing Board members Teresa Wynn Roseborough and Paul Smith for their outstanding service and hear welcome remarks from our distinguished speaker:

Thomas J. Perrelli
Associate Attorney General of the United States

Thursday, December 3
6:00 - 8:00 p.m.

American Constitution Society
1333 H Street NW, 10th Floor
Washington, DC 20005

This event is free but space is limited.  Please RSVP here by Monday, November 30.

President Obama’s plan to transport suspected terrorists from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba to the United States to be tried in American criminal courts came one step closer to fruition on Tuesday when congress voted down a measure to prevent the move.  Nevertheless, those who oppose the president’s plan have not given up hope.  Rep. Mark Kirk, R-Ill., assured Fox News on Tuesday that “the closure of Guantanamo is ‘not a fait accompli.’”

The strategy of those in opposition to the plan seems to be to stall its progress for as long as possible, hoping that the closer to the congressional elections in next November we get, the fewer senators will be able to afford supporting the president on this one, and… they may be right.  Public support for the measure isn’t exactly soaring.

According to Rasmussen Reports, 51% of American voters oppose the president’s plan to try suspected 9/11 terrorists in New York.  Only 30% of American voters believe that suspected terrorists should have access to U.S. courts.  And, 55% of Americans are opposed to the president’s plan to close the infamous Guantanamo Bay detention center by January.  Support for the plan has been shrinking pretty much since it was announced.  With numbers like these, what incumbent would want voters going into the booth with their support for such an unpopular plan fresh on their minds?

These numbers reflect a number of concerns among Americans about the president’s plan.  Some fear that housing accused terrorists in American prisons near American communities will put those communities at risk by encouraging terrorist attacks in these areas.  Others are worried about opening up not so old wounds by bringing the people responsible for so much bloodshed right into the communities that they terrorized.  Many simply feel that terrorists don’t deserve the benefits of our legal system, with all of its guaranteed rights and fair treatment and all, after what they are accused of (and what some have admitted to).

While all of these concerns are rational, I believe that the harm of following the same old course and the benefits of the proposed change in policy far outweigh any potential risks associated with the president’s plan.  I don’t doubt that trying suspected terrorists in American courts would serve as a reminder to those who have already suffered too much because of the inexcusable acts of terrorists.  Trials are always emotionally difficult for those who have suffered because of the accused.  And where, as here, the harm suffered has been great, so too must its reminder be correlatively difficult.

Many of the survivors of the victims of 9/11 are, however, supportive of the president’s plan.  Some see a criminal trial as a long awaited opportunity for closure.  John Feal, a New Yorker who lost half of a foot at ground zero, sees a criminal trial in New York as “poetic justice,” and warns those who fear further attacks that “if you’re afraid of terrorists, then they’ve already won.”

Feal’s warning should be heralded.  Much of our response to the 9/11 massacre has amounted to victories for terrorists, who could wish for nothing better than the opportunity to paint the United States as the evil empire that they imagine it to be.  Guantanamo Bay is one of the central symbols of our post 9/11 mistakes.  I won’t present the argument that Guantanamo Bay and the policies that it symbolizes were a mistake, but if you have any question, I suggest that you read an earlier blog posted in March on this sight by the former chief of staff to Secretary of State Colin Powell titled Some Truths about Guantanamo Bay.  (Here’s the url to that post http://acs.blogs.wm.edu/2009/03/16/some-truths-about-guantanamo-bay/)

Furthermore, the argument that our justice system is just too good for the likes of terrorists misses the point of submitting these guys to the criminal justice system.  We either label terrorists criminals, as we have always done in the past, or we call them combatants, as has become vogue today.  General Wesley Clark, among others, has warned against treating terrorists as combatants in a war.  His concern is partly that such a term, in fact, lends legitimacy to their efforts:  It “dignifies criminality by according terrorist killers the status of soldiers.”   Treating these people like criminals engaged in the unjustified killing of civilians is not too good for these people;  It is treating them like soldiers engaged in combat that is too good for them.

It is true that our criminal justice system offers rights and protections even to the likes of terrorists.  It is also true that terrorists would not afford us the same rights were the tables turned.  But, that we can grant such rights even to the worst criminals in the world is a sign of our strength.  It’s also what differentiates us from them.   Our criminal justice system can obtain justice without rejecting the basic assumption that all human beings ought to be afforded a trial that accords with our values as a nation.  This basic assumption is the backbone of our justice system.  Without it, we would not be who we are.

We don’t ensure fair trials for even the most vicious of criminals because it is what they deserve.  We do so because it is what we, as an advanced western society with a profound respect for justice and human dignity, demand.  The perpetrators of the 9/11 massacre are criminals.  They deserve, just like other heinous criminals responsible for untold destruction of human life (think Timothy McVeigh and Ted Kaczynski) to be brought to justice.  And we deserve not to have our hands bloodied in the process by sacrificing our values on the altar of fear.

Websites referenced in the blog, in the order in which they appear:
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/11/17/republicans-chances-block-gitmo-prisoners-soil/
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/general_politics/august_2009/75_worried_that_gitmo_closing_will_set_dangerous_terrorists_free/
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,575110,00.html
http://www.nydailynews.com/blogs/dc/2009/11/911-survivors-see-justice-in-n.html
http://acs.blogs.wm.edu/2009/03/16/some-truths-about-guantanamo-bay/
Image courtesy of Amnesty International

The Blog of the William and Mary Chapter of the American Constitution Society recently posted an article reporting on and summarizing William Van Alstyne’s November 11 lecture regarding Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, currently pending before the Supreme Court. At the end of the last term, the Court ordered reargument in the case, asking the parties to address whether, for instance, the Federal Government may, consistent with the First Amendment, ban speech by Corporations in support of or in opposition to a particular political candidate. The Court first approved such a ban in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), in a 6-3 decision. Two justices presently on the Court dissented: Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia. (Justice O’Connor, it should be noted, joined Justice Kennedy’s dissent).

Among other things, the ACS article summarizes the case for stringent regulation of corporate speech as such:

“Generally speaking, the campaign reform acts were put into place to prevent large commercial corporations from being able to contribute a large, disproportionate amount of money towards a particular campaign under the idea that such a contribution would make the democratic process less pure. Another reason why the campaign reform statutes were enacted was the fact that people purchase stocks from a corporation to further their own economic interest – not to make a political statement. The Supreme Court has upheld these campaign reform acts in the past, finding that a commercial corporation contributing money from its treasury to a candidate comes too close to bribery.”

This is a fair summary of the rationales that proponents of such regulation have articulated. It should also be noted that such regulation includes outright bans on corporate political speech in connection with elections. Moreover, statutes banning such speech generally allow corporations to set up PACS that collect voluntary contributions from affiliated persons, such as shareholders and employees. Proponents of such bans on corporate speech argue that such PACS produce “enough” speech to vindicate the legitimate rights of corporations and their individual constituents to influence the political process.

Citizens United involves a slightly more complicated provision, Section 203 of the so-called Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002. Section 203 prohibits corporations from speaking 60 days before a general federal election and 30 days before a federal primary, whenever such speech requires expenditures from the corporation’s general treasury, as opposed to the sort of “separate fund” described above. Moreover, Section 203’s prohibitions arguably sweep more broadly than those at issue in Austin, described above, insofar as they apply even to speech that is primarily about issues, so long as a candidate is mentioned and the speech occurs during the requisite unsafe harbors before an election, i.e., when such speech is most likely to be effective.

I do not disagree with Professor Van Alstyne’s description of how the Court might rule in Citizens United. Moreover, I agree that the decision could have major implications for the scope of state and federal authority over speech during political campaigns. Finally, I agree that, at least when it comes to regulation by individual states, the correct application of the Constitution could turn on whether corporations are, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly held or assumed for over a century, “persons” within the meaning of the 14th Amendment.

At the same time, I thought I would take this opportunity to offer some thoughts about the regulation/prohibition of Corporate political speech, from the perspective of someone who has taught Corporate Law and once even wrote about the regulation of corporate speech in a paper published by our own Bill of Rights Journal. See Alan J. Meese, Limitations on Corporate Speech: Protection of Shareholders of Abridgement of Expression, 2 W&M Bill of Rights Journal 305 (1993), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=983547

First, it is important to distinguish between speech, on the one hand, and contributions to candidates, on the other. Much commentary about the case, particularly by proponents of such regulation, muddies the distinction between these two means of influencing the political process.

Citizens United wants to speak, not make a contribution to a candidate or otherwise fund a campaign. Such speech costs money, but so does speech by individuals. (Even bumper stickers, yard signs and billboards cost money. Ditto for advertisements that an individual might take out in the newspaper or on television. Writing a letter to the editor or canvassing a precinct can cost money, particularly if the author or the canvasser must forgo other opportunities to write or canvass). Ditto, too, for the exercise of certain other constitutional rights, e.g., building a church. If a state law provided that “no one shall spend more than $50,000 building a house of worship,” we would (properly) call the law a burden on the exercise of religion, not a regulation of “religious spending.” A proper application of the First Amendment in the Citizens United case requires the Court to distinguish between “speaking” and “contributing.”

Second, the Supreme Court has properly (in my view) held that individuals are generally free to speak as much as they want, even if such speech is very expensive. Thus, the state could not prevent Ross Perot or Bill Gates from spending his entire personal fortune taking out newspaper advertisements in support of a candidate, so long as each really was acting independently. Nor could it prevent Mr. Perot from giving away his fortune to the Church of his choice. It would not matter in this connection if the resulting speech was “disproportionate” to the actual public support for the ideas expressed.

Third, there is no good reason for treating corporations, large or small, any differently from Ross Perot or Bill Gates, both of whom earned most of their wealth from . . . corporations! Corporations are legal fictions, just like “partnerships,” “sole proprietorships,” “limited liability companies,” “labor unions,” “non profit corporations,” etc. Behind these fictions are actual human beings who contribute labor, capital, know how, etc. to a joint enterprise. Corporations, like other forms of business organization, are best understood as a “nexus of contracts” between various categories of individuals that supply inputs to a joint enterprise. Where corporations are concerned, such suppliers include shareholders, debtholders, managers, employees, directors and others. Hopefully such enterprises earn enough to pay off lenders, pay handsome wages and salaries, and earn a profit. In the case of a corporation, some of the profits are paid out as dividends, some are reinvested in new projects, and some remain in the corporate treasury, for future use at the discretion of management.

Fourth, if a corporation speaks, by, for instance, paying for an advertisement in a newspaper, it is because the directors, elected by the shareholders, have hired managers who think such speech is in the best interest of the corporation, i.e., the shareholders. Shareholders are persons. The funds expended are presumably retained earnings that managers are “investing” in speech they believe will benefit the shareholders. Corporate law traditionally grants managers very wide leeway to make investment decisions, e.g., whether to focus on building large or small cars, cars or tractors, tractors or boats, inboard or outboard motors, etc. Economists and economically sophisticated legal scholars explain this leeway by pointing out that various non-legal market mechanisms align the interests of directors and managers on the one hand, and shareholders on the other. These mechanisms are not perfect; no such mechanism is, but they deter directors and managers to some extent from employing retained earnings for projects that do not advance the interests of shareholders.

There is no reason to believe that directors/managers are any less likely to act in shareholder interests when making investments in speech than when making investments in factories, charitable giving, or research and development. If shareholders think Ford is making poor investment decisions, whether the investments are speech or factories, they can sell their shares. In other words, what we sometimes call “corporate speech” is really speech on behalf of persons who have authorized such speech, utilizing resources that the corporation could otherwise pay out to shareholders in dividends or use to invest in new projects.

As a result, bans on “corporate speech” are really bans on individual speech, and they must stand or fall under the same standards applied to analyze bans on individual speech.

Fifth, there are two counterarguments to the pro-speech approach that I have just sketched. First, that corporations receive “special privileges” from the state that justify additional state regulation, privileges such as perpetual life, entity status, and limited liability. Each such privilege, it is said, facilitates the creation of wealth in the economic marketplace that corporations might improperly transfer into the political arena by spending resources on speech that exceeds the “actual public support” for the ideas expressed. Second, that shareholders need protection from managers who will use “their” money to speak about candidates the managers support, whether or not shareholders support them.

The Supreme Court bought the first argument in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1991), and Justice Brennan, in a concurrence, bought the second argument, analogizing corporate speech to a “theft” of shareholder assets to support viewpoints with which shareholders disagree. Neither argument withstands scrutiny, in my view.

Many corporations are quite young, and yet bans on corporate speech apply “across the board,” regardless of the age of the corporation. Hence, the “perpetual life” attribute does not justify the current scope of speech regulation. Moreover, limited liability limits the liability of shareholders, not corporations (who are fully liable for their torts or contract breaches despite limited liability), and it’s a bit odd to invoke a benefit granted to individuals to justify disadvantaging corporations. (Moreover, corporations often “pay” for limited liability because they must pay higher interest rates to compensate voluntary creditors for the latter’s inability to access shareholder assets if the corporation is judgment proof.)

To be sure, limited liability, perpetual life, entity status, etc. all facilitate the separation of ownership from control in large public corporations and thereby facilitate the creation and retention of wealth. (An investor is far more likely to purchase shares in a corporation if he or she knows that he or she can only lose the amount invested, without putting personal assets at risk). Still, lots of background rules, whether contract law, tort law, partnership law, agency law, property law, trademark law, the law of secured transactions, etc., facilitate the creation and retention of wealth by individuals — where would a franchise be without the state action necessary to enforce a trademark — but we don’t therefore conclude that individuals have received “special benefits from the state” that justify additional limits on their speech. Nor would we, for instance, allow the state to squelch speech by individuals to whom it had guaranteed a minimum income, even if the state argued that it was merely preventing the recipients of state largesse from using that largesse to distort the political marketplace. Here again, there is no reason to distinguish individuals from corporations.

Moreover, most industries are characterized by free entry, so there is no reason to believe that the special nature of the corporate form generally allows firms to earn above-average returns, because such returns would just attract additional competition from other corporations. Finally, unless I am mistaken, bans on corporate speech are not reserved for large corporations, but apply even to corporations that are much smaller than many partnerships, for instance. Thus, even taken on their own (unpersuasive) terms, such bans are not narrowly tailored to further their purported interest.

What, though, about the “shareholder protection rationale?” Proponents of this approach argue that, if shareholders want to support a candidate, they can contribute to special funds that then spend the money on speech as directed by the corporation. Under this approach, Justice Brennan said, speech reflects “actual support” for the views expressed. This is mere wordplay. Such speech reflects some actual support, yes, but not the full actual support. As Roberto Romano argued before Austin, reliance upon separate funds is beset by collective action problems. One shareholder’s contribution benefits all shareholders, even those who don’t contribute. The result will be free riding and thus suboptimal expenditures on speech. Such a burden is not justified by any effort to protect shareholders, who have voluntarily agreed to participate in an enterprise that uses retained earnings to speak. Perhaps states could adopt heightened scrutiny of speech to make sure such speech furthers a firm’s interest, but an outright ban, relegating shareholders to suboptimal separate funds, sweeps too far and offends the First Amendment, in my view. For an elaboration of this rebuttal of the shareholder protection argument, see Alan J. Meese, Limitations on Corporate Speech: Protection of Shareholders of Abridgement of Expression, 2 W&M Bill of Rights Journal 305 (1993). http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=983547

Let’s hope the Supreme Court keeps these various principles in mind when reconsidering Austin!

The goals of incarceration are various and can run counter to one another. Retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation are all reasonable purposes of incarceration, and the American prison system seems to have embraced such approaches.  But rehabilitation is also a legitimate goal. And there are a variety of programs attempting to improve the lives of those convicted of crimes. These include efforts outside of prisons, such as drug courts, which give non-violent substance abuse offenders the opportunity to choose treatment over jail time. They also include programs inside of prisons, such as ‘restorative justice’ which is based on the idea that all sides would benefit if offenders could come to terms with what they have done and try to make amends with those they have harmed.  A 2007 documentary explores one intriguing effort to make the goal of rehabilitation a reality.

The Dhamma Brothers, directed by psychotherapist/anthropologist Jenny Phillips, shows the remarkable and profound effects a silent meditation course has on a group of inmates, including rapists and murderers, at Donaldson Correctional Facility, a maximum security prison in Alabama, in 2002. Over the course of ten days, the inmates learn Vipassana meditation, an ancient Buddhist technique which originated in India and was transmitted and preserved in Burma for centuries. Vipassana has in recent years seen somewhat of an explosion in the West; there are many centers throughout the world, including throughout the United States and Canada. The course is rigorous and challenging. Participants meditate for 10 hours per day, starting out with breathing exercises, and around the fourth day switching to a focus on bodily sensations. Meditators pledge to maintain ‘noble silence’ until the final day; and no activities are allowed other than meditating, sleeping, walking, and eating; this means no reading, no writing, no exercising.

This may sound excessive, but the rules create a context in which meditators can make real progress. Participants, perhaps for the first time in their lives, are forced to deal with emotional complexes and face truths that they may have been avoiding for years. The experience can be harrowing, both physically and emotionally, yet it is also cathartic, and many meditators come out of a course feeling more ‘in control’ of themselves than ever before. I have done a few courses and can attest to the power of the experience.  In the film, the effect Vipassana has on the inmates is truly inspiring. Far from what you might expect of convicted rapists and murderers, the prisoners are thoughtful, articulate, and caring individuals who seem truly sorry for the immense pain and suffering they have caused. The director of treatment at the Alabama Department of Corrections noted that “after this 10-day course, inmates were better able to control their anger and better able to conduct themselves.” While the film deals with people who actually have committed violent crimes, the program would be beneficial even for those doing time for drug offenses or the like, as it would allow a respite from what must be a hellish everyday experience.

The film also touches on the challenges faced by those hoping to bring such techniques into prisons. That Vipassana was able to come to a maximum security Alabama prison, even on a small-scale, temporary basis, was largely due to the open-minded views of prison officials. However, things changed when some became anxious that the technique would turn people away from Christianity, and the program was canceled. However, in 2005, with a change in the prison’s administration, it was able to be restarted. One can only hope that such programs will not only continue to exist, but will expand.

The links below are for the Vipassana website, and a New York Times article on the film, which includes a trailer.

http://www.dhamma.org

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/13/movies/13dhar.html

photo courtesy of flickr user Tim Pearce, Los Gatos (http://www.flickr.com/photos/timpearcelosgatos/3557791151/)

It is clear that the First Amendment applies to US citizens. What is not clear, however, is to what extent it applies to corporations. The Court has held that a corporate entity is considered a “person” under the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments; however, the Court has not considered, until now, whether a corporation has rights protected by the First Amendment.

It is important to note, as Van Alstyne points out, that there is a distinction between strictly commercial corporations (like GM) and corporations that are non-profit but advancing ideological principles (like Citizens United). In addition, there is a further distinction between corporations that expend money from their general treasury to advance a cause and those that advance certain causes through PACs (political action committees), which solicit shareholders and others for specific funds.

The plaintiff in this case, Citizens United, is a non-profit organization with an ideological purpose. Most of the funds Citizens United raises come from the contributions made by its own members or from membership dues. However, Citizens United has accepted modest sums of money from a few commercial corporations in the past. The fact that Citizens United has accepted money from some large commercial corporations caused them to fall under the auspices of the campaign reform acts, including the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA).

Generally speaking, the campaign reform acts were put into place to prevent large commercial corporations from being able to contribute a large, disproportionate amount of money towards a particular campaign under the idea that such a contribution would make the democratic process less pure. Another reason why the campaign reform statutes were enacted was the fact that people purchase stocks from a corporation to further their own economic interest – not to make a political statement. The Supreme Court has upheld these campaign reform acts in the past, finding that a commercial corporation contributing money from its treasury to a candidate comes too close to bribery.

The BCRA was an amendment to the campaign reform acts that prevented corporations from airing any television or radio advertisements at certain times of the year, specifically sixty days before a general election and thirty days preceding any primary election. During the 2008 Iowa caucus, for example, there was a blackout period during which corporate funds could not be spent on TV or radio ads for any candidate.

In this case, because Citizens United accepted money from commercial corporations, they were subject to the blackout requirement of BCRA and were forbidden from airing Hillary: The Movie, a film with a negative portrayal of Hillary Clinton, during the general election of 2008. As a result of not being able to show their movie, Citizens United brought suit against the Federal Elections Commission, arguing that the BCRA, as applied, is unconstitutional.

Van Alstyne believes there are three ways the Supreme Court can decide the case: 1) The Court may agree with original plaintiffs and find that the statute, as applied, violates the First Amendment rights of Citizens United; 2) The Court could hold the provisions of the statute void on their face and force Congress to focus the statute much more narrowly on commercial corporations; and 3) The Court could sustain the statute as applied. Van Alstyne argues that because Citizens United is not a commercial organization and only had its film banned because it accepted some money from commercial organizations, the Supreme Court is likely to go with Option 1 and find that the statute, as applied, is a violation of Citizens United’s First Amendment rights.

Obviously, if the court finds the statute unconstitutional as applied, this could have major implications for elections in the United States. Major corporations would be able to spend vast amounts of money on political ads and candidates, potentially confusing voters and skewing the facts. In addition, candidates would feel beholden to their corporate sponsors and may feel obligated to act in the corporations’ interests once elected – not necessarily in the interest of the public. The decision should come be handed down shortly, and it is one that is sure to have a strong effect on our democratic process in the United States.

Koppelman stated that the gay marriage movement is one of the mot successful such movements in U.S. history; ten years ago, no gays could marry; in 1999, Vermont was the first state to allow it, and at present there are nine states, representing almost 25% of the United States by population, that give same-sex couple all the rights of married couples (though only four states actually use the term ‘marriage’). There is a clear trend towards continued acceptance of gay marriage: 58% of 18-34 year olds support it, whereas only 24% of those over 65 do.

Much of Koppelman’s talk focused on presenting a response to the work of the so-called  ‘new natural law’ theorists, such as Robert George, John Finnis, and Patrick Lee. These thinkers have attempted to sketch out what makes the relationships of heterosexual couples intrinsically more valuable than those of homosexuals, even when the former couple is unable to conceive a child.

According to Koppelman, one of the approaches taken by these theorists includes the argument that heterosexual sex involves some ‘two in one-ness,’ or a biological unity, that gay sex doesn’t. According to this argument, each human is an incomplete, potential part of a mated pair that becomes one during the sex act.

Koppelman engaged this argument by stating that simply because two organisms jointly carry out a task does not means that there is ‘organic unity.’ After all, a couple can walk together, arm in arm, and we wouldn’t say there is organic unity embodied in this act. Humans can assign value to anything we like, but at bottom, there is nothing about the reproductive act between a heterosexual, infertile couple that makes that relationship intrinsically more valuable than the relationship between two men.

After all this logic and philosophy, students were ready with some questions.

Asked about what it would take for the Supreme Court to take up the issue of gay marriage, Koppelman pointed out that it is a political ‘hot potato’ and the Court likely doesn’t want to go near it. Moreover, he noted, this is probably for the best, since backlashes are more likely to occur when a movement attempts to take on the whole country before the country is ready (as happened with abortion, in his view), and the ‘good guys’ are already winning this battle.

Koppelman also noted that he has no problem with the term ‘civil unions’ as opposed to ‘marriage,’ because legal recognition of gay and lesbian relationships inherently normalizes them, and makes it inevitable that before long gay marriage will in fact be a reality; it puts us on the slippery slope. Finally, Koppelman observed that the political muscle that this movement now enjoys has its roots in the decisions of gay people to come out, a choice which required great courage at the beginning of the movement, and remains enormously important today.

Professor Koppelman’s remarks were stimulating and informative and presented a picture of a movement destined to succeed, even if not immediately.

In college, I was president of a national honor society, the National Society of Collegiate Scholars (NSCS.)  In 2008, we held our national convention at the Coronado Springs Hotel in Orlando, Florida.  It was here where I met Jeff Smith.  Jeff was a politician who, at the age of 30, ran against Russ Carnahan for the 2004 Missouri congressional seat.  The Carnahan family is synonymous with the Kennedy’s of Massachusetts.  The Carnahan’s are a very prominent political family.  Jeff entered as an unknown and throughout the campaign made a documentary titled “Can Mr. Smith get to Washington Anymore?”  Jeff ran against nine other candidates in this crowded race and built an impressive foundation of political support.  The end result?  He narrowly lost against Russ in the democratic primaries.

Jeff would later go on to win a state senate seat in 2007 and, in 2008, flew down to Florida to speak with members of my organization.  Jeff was a very nice guy and very charismatic.  Despite his loss in 2004, I really could see his political career flourishing.

Let’s fast forward to two night ago.  A friend of mine who writes for a national magazine contacted me.  He was looking for stories of politicians who really made an impact in their communities.  Instead of finding prominent politicians, however, he wanted to find people who are not nationally known.  The theme was “ordinary people doing extraordinary things.”

I immediately thought of Jeff Smith.  This might be his big chance to really make a name for himself with people outside of Missouri, or at the very least, in his home state.  I was about to contact Jeff when I stumbled upon an article.

Apparently, Jeff has now resigned his senate seat and has plead guilty to two counts of conspiracy to obstruct justice.  He will be sentenced in November.

What’s the moral of this story?  Well, someone may joke that it is best not to run against a political family.  The serious answer is: don’t commit conspiracy.

As of October 27, 2009, Deeds was thirteen points behind McDonnell in the polls. If anything could have given Deeds a boost, it should have been President Obama’s campaign appearance at Old Dominion University. The President’s appearance actually made 39% of those polled, less likely to vote for candidate Deeds. Voters seem to be more trusting of McDonnell on the major issues, such as government spending, transportation, and taxes.

One thing that continues to haunt McDonnell, is the thesis he wrote while he was a student at Regent University. McDonnell was thirty-four when he wrote his thesis, so the propositions he made cannot be blamed on his youth. As a student at Regent, McDonnell believed that women with careers were harmful to families, and that the government should “ favor married couples over fornicators and homosexuals”. He also thought access to birth control should be limited to married couples. McDonnell prefers to focus on the issues rather than his questionable beliefs. He does claim that he no longer harbors any negative feelings towards working women, fornicators, or homosexuals.

Both candidates plan to tackle the transportation issue, which is a huge problem in Virginia. The congestion in Northern Virginia and Hampton Roads has been a growing concern for most state residents. McDonnell’s transportation plan includes creating a rail that runs from Northern Virginia to Hampton Roads. He also plans to synchronize stop lights and increase the speed limit to 70 mph on some highways. To finance his transportation plan, McDonnell will rely on federal funding, the surplus from the state’s general fund, and profits from selling ABC stores to the private sector.

Deeds’ transportation plan includes fixing the existing infrastructure. For example, he wants to expand water crossings in Hampton Roads.He also plans to create a high speed rail, and reduce rush hour traffic with flex time schedules, that allow commuters to use the roads in non-peak hours.As far as financing, Deeds’ plan is pretty vague. He says he will create a bi-partisan commission to come up with a concrete funding scheme. Deeds does not agree with using general fund money for transportation because he fears that it would conflict with education funding. He is also against privatizing ABC stores.

Both candidates also plan to address the economy. McDonnell will appoint the lieutenant governor as “Virginia’s Chief Job Creation Officer”. He will also nominate an official to work specifically with rural economic development. Under McDonnell’s plan, every company that creates a minimum of fifty jobs will receive a tax credit of $1,000. McDonnell thinks that attracting fortune 500 companies will be critical to the future of Virginia’s economy. There will also be a focus on creating “green jobs”.

Deeds plans to focus on supporting small minority and women owned businesses. Deeds will also provide a tax credit for job creation, however, his plan is less restrictive than McDonnell’s. Small businesses will receive a tax credit for every job they create. Also like McDonnell, Deeds will focus on creating “green jobs”, and assisting rural areas.

Surprisingly, the candidates have similar views regarding the major social issues. Deeds, an avid hunter, supports 2^nd amendment rights just like his republican competitor. Both candidates believe that marriage is between a man and a woman. Candidate Deeds, however, seems open to legislation intended to protect homosexual relationships. The candidates support the continued use of the death penalty, but only for the most egregious offenses. The only major social issue they definitely disagree on is abortion. Deeds is clearly pro-choice and McDonnell is pro-life.

Both candidates have some great ideas. The election is November 3, 2009. VOTE!

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania not even a week ago overturned 6500 convictions and prison sentences of juvenile offenders in Luzerne County. No, it was not a “soft on crime” decision that declared imprisonment for juveniles unconstitutional. It declared that virtually every single juvenile to appear before the court in Luzerne County in the last five years had been the victim of the prison-industrial complex. Two judges, Mark Ciaverella and Michael Conhan, have been charged with accepting 2.8 million dollars in bribes from the owners of private prisons in Luzerne County to send some extra business their way. The judges were not only accepting bribes from the owners of the prison, but had convinced the county in 2002 that the current, government-run prison was unsafe, and that they should hire a private firm to do the job. Kids were sent to jail for stealing change from unlocked cars, and shooting out windows with a BB gun, among other minor offenses.

Well, at least they were caught, you might say. That is true. They will hopefully spend just as long, if not longer, in prison than the children they sent away for their own material gain. The children’s records will be expunged. But they cannot get back the months or years of their lives they spent in prison, the terror they likely experienced. The scars will follow them for a long time.

While this may be an isolated incident in its execution, it is certainly not an isolated incident in its opportunity. Arizona already has 30% of its prisoners in private facilities, and is considering completely privatizing the rest, including death row.

President Eisenhower warned us about the military-industrial complex because he knew that at the very core of the industry was a desire for nothing but a healthy profit margin - a margin that could only be obtained by killing not only foreign armies, but the sons and daughters of its employees as well. Since he warned us of the dangers of this industry, we have gone to war numerous times, and virtually each time there seems to be something not quite right about the reasons we are given, about the way the war is fought, about the time and money and lives that we spend.

The United States is the world leader in incarceration. 702 out of every 10,000 Americans is in jail. The nearest is Russia, at 628 per 10,000. No country in Europe tops 150 per 10,000. There seems to be something not quite right about a country that claims to uphold liberty and justice for all taking away years of someone’s liberty because they had a few sticks of an illegal drug. Occasionally, as it did in Luzerne County, the mask gets pulled off in a dramatic way. Occasionally, a state tries to privatize its entire prison system. But even beyond that, isn’t there something the matter with a country where so many make their livelihoods and pad their bottom lines by denying their fellow citizens their liberty? Is it just that we have more crime than other Western democracies? Is it that maybe we have gone a little too far in punishing criminals? Or is it that, inside all of us, there is a little bit of what animated the Luzerne county juvenile court judges to work, not for justice, but for the prison-industrial complex?

Sources:

Pennsylvania Supreme Court dismisses juveniles’ convictions after Luzerne County Court scandal
http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2009/10/pennsylvania_supreme_court_dis.html

Luzerne’s youth-court scandal: How?Why?
http://www.philly.com/inquirer/local/pa/20091025_Luzerne_s_youth-court_scandal__How_Why_.html

Death row may go private in Arizona
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2010127223_prison24.html

Military-Industrial Complex Speech, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1961
http://www.h-net.org/~hst306/documents/indust.html

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